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When the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) decided
the Obergefell v. Hodges 1 case and opened marriage to same-sex couples
across the United States, the LGBT rights movement could, after years of
effort, celebrate a huge legal victory. 2 However, only fairy tales end with
“happily ever after,” so new problems appeared soon, arising especially
from the tension between LGBT rights and religious freedom. Thus,
SCOTUS in the post-Obergefell era had to deal with controversial issues
concerning service providers’ religious objections to same-sex marriage.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 3 a baker
refused to make a wedding cake for a same-sex couple since he opposed
same-sex marriage due to his Christian faith. Later in Fulton v. City of
Philadelphia, 4 the City of Philadelphia terminated a contract with a
religious foster care agency that refused to provide service to married
same-sex couples. SCOTUS decided both cases on narrow, fact-specific
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1. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
2. For a detailed description of the road that led to recognition of same-sex marriage in the
USA, see generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE & C HRISTOPHER R. R IANO, MARRIAGE EQUALITY: F ROM
OUTLAWS TO IN-LAWS (2020).
3. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 584 U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 1719
(2018).
4. Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. ___, 141 S.Ct. 1868 (2021).
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grounds and mostly avoided the core questions regarding the clash
between religious rights and antidiscrimination protection of same-sex
couples.
In early 2022, SCOTUS took up 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 5 a new
case concerning a religious web designer who does not want to design
websites for same-sex weddings. This gives SCOTUS an opportunity to
revisit issues that first appeared in Masterpiece Cakeshop. Before
SCOTUS hears the new case, it might be beneficial for lawyers to look
around because foreign courts have dealt with similar cases as well. In
particular, Masterpiece Cakeshop has its counterpart in the Lee v. Ashers
Baking Company 6 judgment delivered by the Supreme Court of the United
Kingdom which, unlike SCOTUS, did not shy away from addressing the
substance of the problem.
This Article focuses on the Masterpiece Cakeshop and Ashers
Baking Company cases, involving bakers whose religious objections to
same-sex marriage led them to refuse to sell cakes to gay customers. 7 The
Article discusses several common ideas appearing in these cases, 8 mainly
the need to distinguish between the message and the messenger when
applying antidiscrimination law and the role of fundamental rights in the
assessment. Based on this analysis, the Article then suggests general steps
for courts to follow when dealing with similar issues in the future.
I. WHAT HAPPENED?
Masterpiece Cakeshop is a well-known American case that has been
widely discussed in the media and academia. 9 In a nutshell, a devout
Christian, Jack Phillips, who makes artistic cakes and owns the
Masterpiece Cakeshop bakery, refused to create a wedding cake for a
same-sex couple. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission later sanctioned
5. 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis, 6 F.4th 1160 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. granted, 2022 WL 515867
(mem.) (U.S. Feb. 22. 2022) (No. 21-476).
6. Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd., [2018] UKSC 49 (UK).
7. Parts of this article have previously been published in Czech as Lenka Křičková, Dorty a
Diskriminace - Příklady Střetu Svobody a Rovnosti v Zahraniční Judikatuře, in P RÁVO NA ROVNÉ
ZACHÁZENÍ : DESET LET ANTIDISKRIMINAČNÍHO ZÁKONA 211–223 (Martin Šmíd ed., 2020).
8. For a more comprehensive comparative analysis of these cases, see René Reyes,
Masterpiece Cakeshop and Ashers Baking Company: A Comparative Analysis of Constitutional
Confections, 16 S TAN. J. CIV. R TS. C IV. LIB. 113–46 (2020); Rex Ahdar & Jessica Giles, The Supreme
Courts’ Icing on the Trans-Atlantic Cakes, 9 OX. J.L. R ELIGION 212–28 (2020).
9. See, e.g., Mark Movsesian, Masterpiece Cakeshop and the Future of Religious Freedom,
42 HARV. J.L. P UB. P OL’Y 711–50 (2019); David N. Saperstein, Masterpiece Cakeshop: Impact on
the Search for Common Ground, in R ELIGIOUS F REEDOM, LGBT R IGHTS, AND THE P ROSPECTS FOR
C OMMON GROUND 479–98 (William N. Eskridge & Robin Fretwell Wilson eds., 2019).
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Phillips for sexual orientation discrimination. Eventually, SCOTUS
concluded that the Commission violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment by showing impermissible hostility towards the
religious beliefs of Phillips who was entitled to a neutral and respectful
consideration of his claims.
The British Ashers Baking Company case may be less familiar to
American audiences. The McArthurs, married spouses, are Christians
who own Ashers Baking Company, a family-run bakery in Northern
Ireland. They sell, among other things, cakes with a graphic design of the
customer’s choice. Gareth Lee is a gay man who volunteers for the LGBT
organization QueerSpace. In 2014, he was invited to a party and decided
to bring a cake from Ashers Baking Company with him. As efforts to
legalize same-sex marriage in Northern Ireland took place at the time, he
ordered a cake with a picture of the cartoon characters Bert and Ernie, the
QueerSpace logo and a sign saying “support gay marriage.” The
McArthurs initially accepted the order, but ultimately cancelled it because
of their religious objection to same-sex marriage.
Lee obtained the cake elsewhere but felt discriminated by the
McArthurs and sued them. Both the County Court in Northern Ireland10
and the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland 11 classified the McArthurs’
conduct as discrimination. The McArthurs challenged the decisions in the
Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (UKSC), which faced the question
whether the McArthurs discriminated against Lee and if so, what role their
fundamental rights played in the case.
In its reasoning, the UKSC first addressed possible sexual orientation
discrimination. Direct discrimination under the applicable law means
treating a person less favorably than others based on a protected
characteristic such as sexual orientation. However, the UKSC opined that
the McArthurs did not refuse to serve Lee because of his sexual
orientation, but because of the sign on the cake, of which they
disapproved. They would not have baked the same cake for any other
customer regardless of sexual orientation. Moreover, the reason for the
refusal was not indissociable from sexual orientation. On the contrary,
anyone can support same-sex marriage. For similar reasons, the UKSC
also dismissed the associative discrimination claim, as the McArthurs did
not take Lee’s relationship to the gay community into account in any way,
but objected merely to the cake he requested. Thus, the UKSC found no
discrimination on the grounds of sexual orientation.
10. Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd., [2015] NI Cty 2 (N. Ir.).
11. Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd., [2016] NICA 39 (N. Ir.).
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The UKSC then considered possible discrimination on the basis of
political opinion, which belongs among prohibited grounds of
discrimination in Northern Ireland. The UKSC held that support for samesex marriage undoubtedly constituted a political opinion and its holders
were therefore protected by antidiscrimination law. The UKSC pointed
out that the idea of distinguishing whether the McArthurs refused Lee’s
order because of his political opinion or because of the message on the
cake could apply in this situation as well. Nevertheless, the UKSC
acknowledged that in this scenario, political opinion may be indissociable
from a particular customer (i.e. if a baker refuses to make a cake with a
sign expressing a particular political opinion, the customers holding this
opinion will not be served). Since the McArthurs’ conduct seen from this
perspective might theoretically amount to discrimination based on
political opinion, the UKSC went on to assess the role of the McArthurs’
fundamental rights, namely their freedom of religion and freedom of
expression protected under Articles 9 and 10 of the European Convention
on Human Rights. 12
The UKSC held that freedom of religion included the freedom not to
manifest one’s religion. Similarly, freedom of expression allows an
individual to choose whether to express an opinion or not. Therefore, the
McArthurs could not be compelled to produce the cake if they deeply
disagreed with the message it conveyed. And it is irrelevant whether third
parties would have understood the sign on the cake to mean that the
McArthurs themselves supported same-sex marriage. The state would
interfere with the McArthurs fundamental rights if it forced them to make
the cake Lee wanted. Such interference would have to be sufficiently
justified, which the UKSC did not find in the case at hand. Thus, the
UKSC reversed the lower courts’ judgments because discrimination did
not occur. 13
Lee appealed to the European Court of Human Rights 14 that had a
chance to review the UKSC’s decision and examine whether individual
rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights had been
breached. But the European Court of Human Rights has recently found
the complaint inadmissible because Lee had not explicitly invoked his
Convention rights in the previous proceedings and had thus failed to meet

12. A human rights catalogue binding within the Council of Europe, which is an international
organization of most European states.
13. [2018] UKSC 49.
14. An international court that interprets the European Convention on Human Rights.
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the conditions for admissibility by not exhausting domestic remedies
first. 15
II. WHAT ARE THE TAKEAWAYS?
The biggest difference between the American and the British cases,
which makes any comparison more difficult, is that only the Ashers
Baking Company judgment deals directly with the core issue of religious
objections to same-sex marriage. In this respect, the Masterpiece
Cakeshop decision appears timid, as SCOTUS did not find the will or
courage to address the merits of the case. This minimalist approach, which
can rightly be criticized, 16 seems striking considering that SCOTUS itself,
knowing the question presented, chose to hear this particular case by
granting a writ of certiorari. On the other hand, the decision can also be
interpreted as a good example of judicial self-restraint. Having found the
grounds for reversing the challenged decision, SCOTUS did not disclose
how it would have viewed the case had the original proceedings not been
tainted by procedural defects. Especially with the divide between
conservative and liberal justices, which at the time often led to a 5-4 vote
in controversial cases, it becomes easier to understand the willingness of
justices on both sides to agree on the lowest common denominator in order
to avoid another ideological clash. 17
The UKSC’s judgment is much more revealing, but it is not perfect
either. The unanimous decision penned by Lady Hale appears
straightforward and clearly reasoned at first sight. On closer examination,
however, it has some weaknesses that will be mentioned below.
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights in the end chose a
similarly cautious approach as SCOTUS and dodged the bullet of
answering the substantive questions by holding the complaint
inadmissible. Although the European Court of Human Rights regularly
employs the principle of subsidiarity and requires that the domestic
remedies be exhausted first, its strict and arguably formalistic decision in
Lee v. United Kingdom still caused some disappointment. 18
15. Lee v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2022) no. 18860/19.
16. See Richard A. Epstein, Symposium: The Worst Form of Judicial Minimalism—
Masterpiece Cakeshop Deserved a Full Vindication for its Claims of Religious Liberty and Free
Speech, SCOTUS BLOG (June 4, 2018), https://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/symposium-the-worstform-of-judicial-minimalism-masterpiece-cakeshop-deserved-a-full-vindication-for-its-claims-ofreligious-liberty-and-free-speech/.
17. In doing so, however, the liberal justices missed the opportunity to form a majority and
address the underlying questions, while Justice Kennedy was still available as the possible swing vote
in favor of LGBT rights.
18. See Natalie Alkiviadou, A Missed Opportunity for LGBTQ Rights, VERFASSUNGSBLOG
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Despite the different approaches of SCOTUS and the UKSC, both
opinions include interesting ideas that might help courts deciding similar
cases in the future. The next part elaborates on a couple of important
common themes that emerged from the two cases.
A. Message v. Messenger
Regarding discrimination, the UKSC came up with a powerful idea
that it should be distinguished whether the bakers refused to fulfill the
order because of the sign on the cake or because of the customer’s
personal characteristic which constitutes a prohibited discriminatory
ground. 19 Only the latter situation could amount to discrimination. In
other words, when thinking about possible sexual orientation
discrimination, the question is if the bakers would have made the same
cake for a customer who is not gay. If so, they would have treated
customers unequally on the grounds of sexual orientation and thus
committed direct discrimination. The same thought process applies to
discrimination based on political opinion. The SCOTUS justices touched
upon this point, too, when they considered how the Colorado Civil Rights
Commission treated other cases resembling Phillips’. Around the time the
Commission sanctioned Phillips, it did not find discrimination in three
similar cases in which other bakers did not serve William Jack who
ordered cakes with images and text conveying disapproval of same-sex
marriage. The majority opinion interpreted this different treatment as a
sign of the Commission’s hostility towards Phillips’ religion. On the
contrary, dissenting Justice Ginsburg as well as concurring Justice Kagan
thought these cases might have been justifiably distinguished because
Phillips refused to create a wedding cake for the same-sex couple due to
their sexual orientation, while the other bakers did not serve the customer
because of the particular design of the cake he ordered.
Thus, both the American and the British decisions involve some
emphasis on the difference between objecting to a message (the cake) and
to a messenger (the customer). This idea is entirely logical and consistent
with the primary purpose of prohibiting discrimination, i.e. to protect
individuals from being treated less favorably because of personal
characteristics that they typically cannot choose or change (e.g. race,
(2022), https://verfassungsblog.de/a-missed-opportunity-for-lgbtq-rights/; Tom Lowenthal, Lee v.
UK:
Exhausting
Domestic
Remedies,
OXFORD
HUMAN R IGHTS HUB (2022),
https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/lee-v-uk-exhausting-domestic-remedies/.
19. See also Eugenio Velasco Ibarra, Lee v. Ashers Baking Company Ltd.: The Inapplicability
of Discrimination Law to an Illusory Conflict of Rights, 83 MOD. L. R EV. 190–201 (2020).
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gender, and sexual orientation). But the cases also show how complicated
it might become to apply this principle in practice.
In Ashers Baking Company, the lower courts’ decisions illustrate the
difficulties well. First, the trial court compared the situation of a gay man
demanding a cake to promote same-sex marriage with that of a straight
man demanding a cake to promote conventional marriage. With this
choice of comparator, it makes sense that the trial court found less
favorable treatment based on sexual orientation because only one of the
customers in question would have been served. Second, the appellate
court reasoned that same-sex marriage is so closely tied to the LGBT
community that refusing to bake a cake supporting it actually means
treating people less favorably due to their sexual orientation.
In Masterpiece Cakeshop, the justices did not agree whether the
situations of Phillips and the other bakers could be distinguished. Justice
Kagan and Justice Gorsuch, in their concurring opinions, closely
examined this issue. 20 Justice Kagan argued that Phillips refused to serve
the same-sex couple based on their sexual orientation because he would
have made a wedding cake for an opposite-sex couple. Justice Gorsuch
thought the cake was the problem, not the customers’ sexual orientation.
He argued that Phillips did not refuse to bake any cake, but a cake for a
same-sex wedding, which he would sell to nobody regardless of their
sexual orientation. This dispute between Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Kagan shows that the solution changes depending on how broadly or
specifically the cake in question is defined (whether it is just a cake, a
wedding cake, or a cake for a same-sex wedding) and what exactly the
cake in a particular case is supposed to look like.
To sum up, the idea that business owners can refuse certain orders
due to their content but not due to the customer’s personal protected
characteristics (such as sexual orientation) attracted the attention of both
courts, with the UKSC making it the foundation of its reasoning. Simply
put, this means business owners should generally be able to choose what
services to provide, but not to whom. Clearly, it is sometimes hard to
define the message and the messenger under the specific facts and
recognize which one caused the religious objection or whether they are
inextricably linked. Nevertheless, the principle still seems very helpful
when deciding if discrimination could possibly occur or not.

20. See also John Corvino, “The Kind of Cake, Not the Kind of Customer”: Masterpiece,
Sexual-Orientation Discrimination, and the Metaphysics of Cakes, 46 P HIL. TOPICS 1–19 (2018).
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B. Bakers’ Fundamental Rights
Even if bakers treat customers less favorably on the basis of a
protected personal characteristic, the bakers’ fundamental rights might
stand in the way of classifying their conduct as discrimination. The first
fundamental right that comes to mind is probably freedom of religion.
Maybe surprisingly, however, freedom of speech proved to be equally or
more important in the analyzed cases.
SCOTUS did not directly address the possibility of exempting the
baker from the obligation to serve the same-sex couple in Masterpiece
Cakeshop, so it did not have to choose between applying the Free Exercise
Clause or the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Since
SCOTUS expressly mentioned the general rule that religious objections
cannot justify discriminating against people with a protected
characteristic, it would seem that the religious freedom argument by itself
would have failed. Indeed, this argument had not been expected to
succeed by the experts before the Masterpiece Cakeshop decision was
issued, 21 nor was it a central claim in the petitioner’s brief which focused
a little more on the free speech aspect. 22 Specifically, the petitioner relied
on the compelled speech doctrine and argued he could not be forced to
create a custom artistic wedding cake if it conflicted with his beliefs.
Although the majority opinion does not provide any clear guidance on this
issue, Justice Thomas discussed it in more detail in his concurring opinion
where he explained why the prohibition of compelled speech should apply
and how it should lead to strict scrutiny of the state’s actions.
Additionally, SCOTUS chose to focus exclusively on the issue of
compelled speech in the new 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis case that it is
about to hear.
The UKSC relied on both freedom of religion and freedom of
expression. Possibly inspired by American jurisprudence, the UKSC
applied the compelled speech doctrine to these rights and reasoned that
nobody should be forced into an expression (religious or not) they deeply
disagree with. 23 In the European context, this approach is rather novel, so
the UKSC could not rely on extensive previous case law. 24 It is also
21. See Movsesian, supra note 9, at 719–20.
22. See Brief for Petitioners, Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado C.R. Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719
(2018) (No. 16-111), 2017 WL 3913762.
23. For the pros and cons of the compelled speech doctrine application in this case, see Jacob
Rowbottom, Cakes, Gay Marriage and the Right against Compelled Speech, U.K. C ONST. L. ASS’N
(2018), https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2018/10/16/jacob-rowbottom-cakes-gay-marriage-and-t h eright-against-compelled-speech /.
24. To support its conclusion, the UKSC cites, inter alia, case law of the European Court of
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questionable how well the compelled speech doctrine fits with the
religious aspect of the case. Surely, freedom of religion includes a choice
to hold or not to hold religious beliefs as well as to practice or not to
practice a religion in public. But the UKSC did not explain how these
rights would be affected in the case at hand. After all, the McArthurs were
not compelled to engage in any religious act, since baking a cake could
hardly be considered an exercise of faith. If anything, they were compelled
to communicate a particular message. Therefore, it seems logical to focus
primarily on the freedom of expression in this situation.
Furthermore, the UKSC did not require the message on the cake to
be attributed to the McArthurs. An outside observer would probably
understand that the sign on the cake expresses an opinion of the customer,
not the bakers. 25 No one forced the McArthurs to endorse same-sex
marriage. According to the UKSC, the mere process of baking the cake
interfered with the McArthurs’ fundamental rights. Unfortunately, the
UKSC did not explain why it opted for this, rather strict, solution.
Moreover, the UKSC did not consider if the McArthurs would actually
have to make the cake themselves. First, the image on the cake was only
supposed to be a copy of the customer’s design, so the bakers’ personal
input would have been minimal. Second, the McArthurs employed 65
people (not all Christians) some of whom could have made the cake
without any religious objections. Indeed, requiring some degree of
personal contribution (e.g. in case of an artistic custom-made cake or a
hand-written message) might limit the exemptions based on prohibition
of compelled speech in a desirable way.
Ultimately, the fundamental rights argumentation led the UKSC to
allow the bakers’ religious objection to prevail over the protection of
same-sex couples. SCOTUS did not expressly rule this option out either.
Allowing such an exemption from antidiscrimination law creates a
challenge of keeping it restrictive enough to make sure that the business
owners will not abuse it to normalize discrimination. Unfortunately, the
courts identified the conflicting values at stake but did not attempt to
balance them.
Last but not least, an aspect both courts almost completely ignored
in their reasoning is the relationship between legal entities and
fundamental rights. The decisions focus mainly on the bakers as
Human Rights, but the cited judgment addresses only freedom of religion, not compelled speech. In
particular, the case concerns Members of Parliament who were forced to take their oath of office
referencing the Gospels. See Buscarini, et al. v. San Marino, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1999) No. 24645/94.
25. For example, if a mother buys her child a cake that says “Happy Birthday,” even the child
will understand that the wish on the cake is not from the baker.
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individuals, but the cases concern also Masterpiece Cakeshop and Ashers
Baking Company. The UKSC only stated that punishing Ashers Baking
Company for discrimination would impact the McArthurs as well and
interfere with their fundamental rights. 26 However, that does not resolve
the issue whether companies have the same fundamental rights as
individual bakers, even rights as personal as freedom of religion. Previous
case law suggests that they might, at least to some extent. 27 But then the
question arises as to who determines the religious or other beliefs of a
legal entity. In case of a small family business, it is tempting to identify
the beliefs of the legal entity with those of its owner, but in a case of a
large company such a solution would be difficult to imagine. In the future,
therefore, courts will need to decide how to attribute fundamental rights
to legal entities (or to which ones) when considering possible exemptions
from antidiscrimination law.
III. WHAT NOW?
Although it might not be about cakes next time, problems with
business owners’ religious objections to same-sex marriage will likely not
disappear 28 and, unless the legislature brings a comprehensive solution,
courts will have to deal with it again. Of course, the outcome will depend
on the applicable law and the unique facts of the given cases.
Nevertheless, the Masterpiece Cakeshop and Ashers Baking Company
decisions can at least provide the courts with some inspiration on how to
proceed. Several general steps might help the courts structure their
thinking about similar issues in the future.
First, discrimination can only occur when a person is treated less
favorably on prohibited discriminatory grounds (like sexual orientation).
Thus, courts need to distinguish whether the business owner refuses to
fulfill the order because of the product the customer seeks or because of
the customer’s sexual orientation. In other words, would the business
owner accept the exact same order from a customer who is not gay? If so,
the business owner might commit discrimination.
Things may get more complicated when the business owner objects
to the product which is, however, closely linked with the customer’s
sexual orientation. This can happen in the wedding context–for example,
26. See also Ibarra, supra note 19, at 200.
27. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby, 573 U.S. 682 (2014).
28. For examples of similar cases in Europe, see Romanița Elena Iordache, Matters of
Individual Conscience or Non-Discriminatory Access to Public Services and Goods?: Denial of
Access to Public Goods and Services under the Colours of Religious Ethos, EUR. EQUAL. L. R EV. 30,
31 (2019).
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probably only a same-sex couple will request a wedding cake with figures
of two grooms on it. In that case, sexual orientation remains the reason
behind the unequal treatment and courts should view it as possible
discrimination. Depending on how strong the link between the product
and the customer’s sexual orientation is, the discrimination can be either
direct if the two factors are inseparable, or at least indirect if the two
factors are likely to coincide in vast majority of cases.
Second, courts also need to consider the business owners’
fundamental rights, namely their freedom of religion and freedom of
expression. If possible, it seems best to employ both in a complementary
manner, but the prohibition of compelled speech might play an especially
important role here. Additionally, courts should clarify under what
circumstances (if at all) companies enjoy these rights. 29
Third, the hardest task is to weigh the fundamental rights at stake
against antidiscrimination law protecting same-sex couples. The
balancing exercise will vary in different countries, be it for instance an
appropriate level of scrutiny in the United States or a proportionality test
in Europe, but the factors to consider remain the same. In particular, the
business owners’ fundamental rights should prevail if an outside observer
could mistakenly attribute the message (which they so strongly disagree
with) to them instead of the customer. Strong arguments favoring business
owners also exist when their personal contribution is necessary. That can
happen for example if they are asked to be directly involved in the
wedding by being present 30 or to create a custom-made artistic product
using their unique skills. However, exemptions should only be granted if
the business owners cannot delegate the task to one of their employees or
subcontract it. 31
On the contrary, the argument that the same-sex couple can be served
elsewhere lacks persuasiveness because it underestimates that, besides the
economic consequences, discrimination also involves dignitary harm. 32
Moreover, research shows that discrimination causes a lot of practical
29. There might even be some differences depending on the size of the company. For example,
Professor Laycock suggests that religious exemptions in the wedding context should not be granted
to “large and impersonal businesses,” but only to “very small businesses, where the owner is likely to
be personally involved in providing any services.” Douglas Laycock, Liberty and Justice for All, in
ESKRIDGE & WILSON, supra note 9, at 24, 29.
30. See also Kent Greenawalt, Mutual Tolerance and Sensible Exemptions, in ESKRIDGE &
WILSON, supra note 9, at 102, 107–09.
31. See Robin Fretwell Wilson, Bathrooms and Bakers: How Sharing the Public Square Is the
Key to a Truce in the Culture Wars, in ESKRIDGE & WILSON, supra note 9, at 419–20; Mariëtta D. C.
van der Tol, Conscience and Cakes: Reaffirming the Distinction Between Institutional Duties and
Individual Rights, 9 OXF. J. L. R ELIGION 372 (2020).
32. See Laycock, supra note 29, at 29–30.
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burdens to same-sex couples getting married even if they eventually find
a place where their order is accepted. 33
Overall, the suggested framework would enable courts in individual
cases to allow for sufficiently narrow religious exemptions. It preserves
the general principle that customers must have equal access to goods and
services offered to public, but at the same time creates space to take the
exceptional circumstances regarding religious business owners into
account. Thus, needs of both sides (i.e. religious business owners and
LGBT people) can be accommodated.
As Justice Kennedy noted in the Masterpiece Cakeshop majority
opinion: “[T]hese disputes must be resolved with tolerance, without undue
disrespect to sincere religious beliefs, and without subjecting gay persons
to indignities when they seek goods and services in an open market.”34
Finding the right balance is not easy. Hopefully, this Article helps by
discussing what lessons courts on both sides of the Atlantic can learn from
the Masterpiece Cakeshop and Ashers Baking Company cases.

33. See Netta Barak-Corren, Religious Exemptions Increase Discrimination Toward Same-Sex
Couples: Evidence from Masterpiece Cakeshop, 50 J. LEGIS. S TUD. 75 (2021).
34. Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S.Ct. at 1732.

